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Translations for the Norfolk Ledger from Lisbon papers, received by the Sheffield.
Lisbon, June 19.
After the defeat of Soult in the battle of Albuera, and of the conquest of Figueras in Catalonia, the military operations of the French in our Peninsula, have necessarily been changed very considerably. Suchet leaving a few troops in Arragon, and on the frontiers of Valencia, marched to Catalonia to join Macdonald's corps, and to threaten Tarragona, and to endeavor to restore the affairs of his country, which in that Province, were in the lowest state.
Soult seeing the 5th army driven beyond Llerena, Olivenza taken, and Badajos besieged, joined the reserve of the army of Andalusia to the 5th army, drew all the forces he could possibly obtain from Sebastiani, and Victor, and with an army of 26 to 27,000 men, endeavored to relieve Badajos, in which he was defeated with great loss. Soult being no doubt directed to keep possession of Andalusia at all events if possible, General Drouet was ordered from the north to his assistance, with an army of about 9000 men. About the same time General Marmont with the remains of the army of Portugal marched to the south of Spain. The possession of Andalusia, seems a primary and the relief of Badajos, a secondary object, if we may judge from these various movements. In the mean time the two great provinces of Old and New Castile and Leon, and that of Arragon remain with very few troops, in consequence of which, the two armies of Galicia and Valencia, have now an excellent opportunity of overcoming the small French garrisons that are in them, re-conquering many towns, and of regaining the ground lost, whilst those provinces were occupied by the French.
When we turn to the south of Spain, as it regards the grand armies, it is to be observed that the corps of Sebastiani and Victor, which were left to keep in check the 3d and 5th Spanish armies, are not competent to that object; Sebastiani's corps was routed by Gen. Freyre, and if that of Victor is attacked, the probability is that it will experience the same fate or at least that it will find itself in a very embarrassed situation; under these circumstances Soult must either join these corps to his and lose Andalusia; or he will be compelled to make detachments from his own army to support those other corps, if our excellent General does not think proper to purchase a victory in a great battle, and by the loss of much blood. The French cannot keep united long, as they hold those provinces by the point of the bayonet.
It is not our intention to anticipate what will be done—what we have remarked is the actual state of affairs, from which a judgment of the future may be formed.
June 21.
We have received the Arragon Gazette to the 29th ult. and find in them important news. Suchet had not raised the siege of Tarragona as had been supposed, but remained before that place, where there had been some actions of more or less importance. Some English ships of war defend the place on the sea-side, where it is weaker than on the land side. Marquis Campoverde has landed in the city with a division of Catalan troops, some artillerists and plenty of ammunition and provisions drawn from the province of Valencia.
June 22.
Extract of a despatch from Lord Wellington to his Excellency Don Miguel Forjaz, dated head quarters, Quinta da Gramicha, June 13, 1811.
In consequence of the report of the chief engineer Lieut. Col. Fletcher, that the fire from fort Christopher would considerably obstruct our operations on the left of the Guadiana, and that a breach made in the outworks by the fire on the 6th, was much widened, I determined to attempt to carry that fort by assault, on that very night. In pursuance of this determination, Major General Huston, who conducted the operations of the siege on the right of the Guadiana, ordered a detachment of the 85th regiment under the command of Major McIntosh, to make the attack. The troops advanced under a tremendous discharge of shot and shells from the out works, notwithstanding which they advanced with the greatest intrepidity, and in the best order, to the bottom of the ditch. Having arrived at the breach they found that the enemy had removed the rubbish from the bottom of the scarp, and in spite of the application of their scaling ladders, they found the breach impracticable, and were obliged to retreat with some loss.
The fire from our batteries was kept up against fort St. Christopher and the town without intermission, on the 7th, 8th and 9th, on which last day, the breach in the wall of the fort appeared to be considerable, and I determined to make another attempt to carry it. Major Gen. Houston ordered another detachment under the command of Major-General McGeechy, of the 17th Portuguese regiment, for this service. This officer with the others employed on this occasion, had been reconnoitring the breach, and the different approaches, they advanced to the assault at 9 P. M. with the greatest order and intrepidity, under a similar tremendous fire that was experienced on the 6th. On their arrival at the breach, it was found impracticable, the enemy having again cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the scarp. The detachment suffered considerably, and Major McGeechy was unfortunately killed, with some other officers, notwithstanding which the troops kept their ground, until a retreat was ordered by Major-General Houston.
After the battle of Albuera, I undertook the siege of Badajoz, believing that the means at my disposal would enable me to reduce the place before the end of the second week in June, at which time I expected the reinforcements from the frontiers of Castile, for Marshal Soult would arrive; but in the calculation of these means I have been deceived.
It was now evident from the report of the engineers, and my own observation, that the place would not be reduced but by the erection of works, which would require much time and labor in their construction. An assault upon the works before the town, if it had succeeded, would not have availed, unless we could obtain possession of Fort Saint Christopher, for want of room to form the troops, to attack the intrenchments within.
On the morning of the 10th I received an intercepted dispatch from the Duke of Dalmatia (Soult) to the Duke of Ragusa, (Marmont) of which I send you a copy.— This letter clearly shews that the enemy's design was to concentrate all his forces in Estremadura, and I had reason to believe that the corps under Gen. Drouet, which had marched from Toledo on the 28th and 29th of May, and which was expected at Cordova on the 5th and 6th instant, would on the 10th form a junction with Soult, towards which it was marching according to all my advices. The movement of this corps would alone have made it necessary to have raised the siege of Badajoz. In addition; on the same morning I received information from the frontiers of Castile which left no doubt on my mind of the destination of the army of Portugal (late Massena's) which was rapidly moving south, and was expected to arrive at Merida on the 15th instant.— Under all these circumstances, I determined to raise the siege. [Here Lord Wellington notices the conduct of the officers and soldiers during the siege, and in the assaults, and then proceeds.]
Inclosed I transmit to your excellency the returns of the killed and wounded, by which you will observe that with the exception of what was sustained in the two attacks upon Fort Saint Christopher, our loss has been very trifling. The blockade of Badajos is still continued closely:*
I have not understood that the enemy has moved from his position in Llerena; I suppose the arrival of the 9th corps has been delayed beyond what was expected, and it is probable that Soult will not move from that place, until he is well informed of the motions of the army of Portugal.— That army left Tormes on the 3d, and its advanced guard reached Ciudad Rodrigo, on the evening of the 5th. On the following morning he moved forward, and lieutenant-general Sir Brent Spencer withdrew his advanced guard first to Nave de Aver, and from thence to Alfatates. I enclose you lieutenant general Spencer's dispatch relative to these operations.
I imagine, that the motive of the enemy's march in this direction was to throw a convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo, as on the following day, the 7th, the whole force was put in motion marching towards Moras Verdes, and the pass of Banos, near which general Regnier had been posted, since the 5th instant, with two divisions of the army of Portugal, one of those divisions passed through it, on the evening of the 8th, these two divisions, I suppose, arrived at Placentia on the 9th, and the whole army on the 10th.
I have the honor to be, &c.
P. S. Since writing the above I have received information that the corps under general Drouet, concentrated yesterday on the right of the enemy's army in Berlenga and Asuaga; another communication states, that his cavalry was this morning in motion in the direction of Los Santos. The British cavalry composed of 2d and 3d divisions, were upon the point of marching from Villa Franca, and Almendralejo to Albuera. I have ordered general Hamilton's division to march thither, and I shall go myself there the moment I receive a confirmation of this news.
Copy of the intercepted dispatch from marshal Soult to marshal Marmont referred to in the preceding letter:
LLERENA, 5th June.
Monsr. Marshal,
In answer to the letter which you did me the honor to write from Salamanca on the 16th of May, by the return of your aid de camp, captain Fahier, I informed you that I would be able to commence my march in the beginning of June. This period has arrived, and I am only waiting for information from you to regulate my movements, in order to effect our junction, and execute our plans. I have the honor to request you to inform me of your operations, as early as possible, and to hasten your march to Merida. There is no time to lose, without exposing ourselves to fatal consequences; we must be beforehand with the reinforcements which the enemy expects, and Badajos will be saved. I shall take up my march within 3 days, let me hear from you or not.
I have the honor to be the General in Chief of the army of the South.
THE DUKE OF DALMATIA.
Official letter of Lieutenant General Sir B. Spencer to Lord Wellington, referred to in the despatch of the latter.
Scioto, 7th June
My Lord,
In my letter of the 5th inst. from Villa Formosa I had the honor to inform your Excellency, that I had just returned from the heights near Gallegos, from whence I discovered a body of the enemy's troops, composed of 500 cavalry and 2500 infantry, with artillery entered Ciudad Rodrigo, by the road from Salamanca. I requested col. Waters, to remain on the heights to observe if any other troops of the enemy followed, and from his information, I have reason to believe that another body of infantry, cavalry, and artillery entered Ciudad Rodrigo, in the course of the night.
According to your Excellency's instructions, as soon as I heard of the enemy's movements towards Ciudad Rodrigo, I concentrated the troops under my command, and made the necessary preparations for a retreat. The enemy, as I had expected, advanced at the break of day in two columns, the one in the direction of Gallegos, and the other in that of Carpio, and Espeja. The first was a heavy column of cavalry, and infantry, with some artillery: the second consisted of 6000 infantry at least, but perhaps much more, as from the nature of the ground, the rear guard of these columns could not be perceived, they had upwards of 2000 cavalry and ten pieces of artillery, which marched through the plain in front of Fuentes d'Honor, on account of the plain which gave the enemy's cavalry the advantage; I ordered the light dragoons under brig. gen. Crawford, to retreat first from Gallegos, and Espeja, to Naves d'Aver. Observing the rapidity of the enemy's movements, I ordered the light division and the horse artillery, to fall back upon Alfayates; the 1st and 5th division gradually retired upon Aldea de Ponte, and Naves d'Aver to the heights.
Notwithstanding the superiority of the enemy's cavalry in number, under general Montbrun, all his attempts to out flank ours, failed in every instance, and the retreat was made in a masterly manner. The Royals under Col. Clifton, and the 14th dragoons, the only corps employed in covering our front in Villa de Egoa, behaved in the best manner. Our loss on this occasion was 10 wounded, 9 missing, 6 horses killed, 10 wounded and 4 missing
I do not exactly know the enemy's designs, I only know with certainty that he left Salamanca with 18,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 31 pieces of artillery.— I have the honor, &c.
B. SPENCER.
His Excellency LORD WELLINGTON.
* The whole number killed from the commencement to the raising the siege 148, wounded 558.—Translator.American Stories
Tronslatious for the NorfOlt Ledger from Lisbon papers. receiced by the SheeDletd.
LISBON, june IL.
After the defeat of Soult in the battle of 4Ibuhera, and Of the conquest OF Flgu- eras in Catalonia, the military operations Of the French in our Peninsula, have ne cessarily been changed very considerably. Souehet leaving few troops in Arragon, and on the frontiers of Valencia, marched to Catalonia to join Macdonaid's CORPS and to threaten Tarragona, and to endea- yor to restore the affairs of his country, which in that Province, were in the low est state.
SouIt seeing the 9Th army driven be- youd Llerena, Olivenza taken, and Bada- los beseiged. Joined the reserve OF the ar INV Of Andalusia to the 9Th army, drew ali the forces he could possibly obtain from Sebastian, and Victor. and with an army Of 26 to 81 900 men. endeavored to relieve Badajos, in which he was defeated with great loss. Soalt being no doubt directed to keep possession OF Andaiusia at all events if possible, General Drouet was ordered from the north to his assis- lance, with an army of about 5000 men. About the same time General MarmOnt with the remains of the army of Portu- gal marched to the south ofSpain. The Dossession of Andalusia, seems primary and the relief of BadajOs, secondary OBJ iect, if we may judge from these various movements. In the mean time the two great provinces of Old and New CASTLE and Leon, and that of Arragon remain with very few troops, in consequence OF which, the two armies of Gallacia and Valencia, have now an excellent Opportu- nity Of overcoming the small French gar risons that are in them, re-cOnquerlng MANY towns, and of regaining the ground lost. whilst those provinces were occupied by the French.
when we turn to the south Of Spain, as Il regards the grand armies, it is to be OBJ served that the corps of Sebastian and Victor. which were left to keep in check the Sd and 9Th Spanish armies, are not competent to that object; Sebastiani's corps was routed by Gen. Freyre, and if that of Victor is attacked, the probability is that it will experience the same fate or at least that it will find itself in very embarrassed situation: under these cir cumstances Soult must either join these corps to his and lose Andalusia OF he will be compelled to make detachments from his own army to support those other eorps, if our excellent General does not think proper to purchase victory in great battle, and by the loss Ofmuch blood. The French cannot keep united long, as they hold those provinces by the point OF the bayOnet.
Tits not our intention to anticipate what will be done-what we have remarked is the actual state of affairs, from which Judgment Of the future may be formed.
June 81.
We have received the Arragon Gazette to the 29th ult. and find in them impor- faint news. Souchet had not raised the seige of Tarragona as had been supposed, lint remained before that place, where there had been some actions OF more or less Importance. Some English ships OF wardefend the place on the side, where it is weaker than on the land side. Mar guis Campoverde has landed in the city Wltn ulNlSlOu VI Sdtdiuh tiOOi'os SOHsS artillerists aud plenty of ammunition and provisions draws from the province Of Va lentia.
June %.
Extract of despatch from Lord Wei linston to his excelleney Don Miguel Forjaz, dated head quarters, Quinta da Gramieha, June is, 1911.
In consequence of the report of the rbief engineer Lieut.. Col. Fletcher. that the fire from fort Christopher would con- s:derabiy obstruet our operations on the left of the Guadiana, and that breach made in the outworks by the fire on the 9th, was much widened, 1 determined to attempt to carry that fort by assault, on that very night. Inpursuanee otthis de- PENNINGTON, Major General Huston, who conducted the operations OF the siege on the right of the Guadiana, ordered a de-
dCtdchs NC tiooPS W 70
mendous discharge of shot and shells from the out works, notwithstanding which thew advanced with the greatest mtrepi- dity. and in the best order, to the bottom of the ditch. Having arrived at the breach thew found that the enemy had removed the rubbish from the bottom OF the scarp' and in spite of the application OF their scaling ladders, they found the breach I'M practicable, and were obliged to retreat with some loss.
The fire from our batteries was kept up against fort St. Christopher aud the town without intermission, on the 9TH, Sth anu 9th, on which last day, the breach in the wall of the fort appeared to be considera- ble. and + determined to make another attempt to carry it. Major Gen. Houston ordered another detachment under the command of Major General McGeeehy' of the 18th Portuguese regiment, for this service. This officer with the others en- Moved on this occasion, had been recon- NOTHING the breach, and the different ap- proaches, they advanced to the assault at P. NJ. with the greatest order and ntrc- piditv, under a similar tremendous fire that was experienced on the 9th. On their arrival at the breach, it was found impracticabIe, the enemy having again cleared the rubbish from the bottom OF the scarp. The detachment suffered consi- derably. and Major McGeechy was unior- tunately killed, with some other officers, Notwithstanding which the troops kept their ground, until a retreat was ordered by Major General Houston.
After the battle Of Albuara, [ under took the siege of Badajoz, believing that the means at my disposal would enable me to reduce the place before the end OF the second week in June, at which time eX- peeted the achievements from the from tiers of CASTLE, for Marshal Soult would arrive but in the calculation of these means have been deceived.
1t was now evident from the report Of the engineers, and my own observation. that the place would not be reduced but by the erection of works, which would re- quire much time and labor in their con struction. An assault upon the works be- fore the town, if it had succeeded, would not have availed, unless we could obtain possession of Fort Saint Christopher, for want of room to form the troops, to at tack the intrenchments within.
On the morning of the 10th 1 received an intercepted dispatch from the Duke Of Dalmatia (Soult) to the Duke of Ragusa, (Marmont) of which | send you copy This letter clearly shews that the enemy's design was to concentrate all his forces in Estremadura, and had reason to believe that the corps under Gen. Drouet, which had marched from Toledo on the 2Sth and e9th of May, and which was expect ed at Cordova on the 5th and 9th instant. would on the 10th form junction with Soult, towards which it was marching ac- cording to all my adyices. The move ment Of this corps would alone have made it necessary to have raised the siege of Badaioz. In addition; on the same morn ing / received information from the from tiers of CASTLE which left no doubt on my mind of the destination of the army Of Portugal date Massena's) which was ra pidly moving south, and was expected to arrive at Merida on the 18th Instant Under all these circumstances, L deter mined to raise the seige. Here Lord VEL lington notices the conduct Of the officers and soldiers during the seige, and IN the assaults, and then proceeds.
Inclosed l transmit to your excellency the returns of the killed and wounded, by which you will observe that with the ex- eeption of what was sustained in the two attacks upon Fort Saint Christopher, our loss has been very trifling. The blockade of Badaios is still continued closely:*
Ihave not understood that the enemy has moved from his position in Llerena I suppose the arrival Of the 9th corps has been delayed beyond what was expected, and it is probable that Soult will not move from that place, until he is we'll informed ofthe motions of the AMY Of PORTUGAL That army left Tonnes on the Sd, and its advanced guard reached Ciudad Rodrigo, -. Al, ,,n,;,s ~ the eth IN tho foI
!, n,v,s march in this direction was 70 l!foH . convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo. as on the following day, the 9TH, the whole lorce was nut in motion marching towards Mo. ras Yerdes, and the pass of Bantos' near which general Regnier had been pesteo' since the 9Th instant, with two DIVISIONS If the army of Portugal, one Of those d'- visions passed through it, on the evening Of the sth, these two divisions, l suppose arrived at PIacentia on the 9th, and the whole army on the 10th.
have the honor to be, &c.
P,S. Since writing the above l have re- ceiyed information that the corps under general Drouet, concentrated yesterday on the right of the enemy's army in Ber- lenga and Asuaga another communiea- tion states, that his cavalry was this morn ING in motion in the direction of Los San tos. The British cavalry composed OF I'd and Sd divisions. were upon the point of marching from Villa Franco, and Al mendralejo to Albuera. have ordered general Hamilton's division to march Thu Their, and shall 60 myself there the mo- ment receive confirmation OF this news
Copy of the intercepted dispatch from marshal Soult to marshal Marmont re- ferred to in the preceding letter
LLERENA, 9Th June. .Honsr. Marshal,
Tn answer to the letter which you did me the honort to write from Salamanca on the 18th of May, by the return of your aid de camp, captain Fahier, informed YOU that l would be able to commence my march in the beginning of June. This period has arrived, and | am only waiting for information from you to regulate my movements, in order to effect our june ton, and execute our plans. 1 have the honor to request you to inform me of your operations, as early as possible, and to hasten your march to Merida. There is no time to lose, without exposing our selves TO fatal consequences we must be beforehand with the reinforcements which me enemy expects, and Badajos will be saved. l shall take up my march within days, let me hear from you or not.
[ have the honor to be the General in Chief OF the army of the South.
TIE MARECHAL DUKE DE DALMATIA.
Official letter of Lieutenant General SirB. Spencer to Lord Wellington, refer red to in the despatch of the latter.
SCIoTo, 9TH June
In my letter Of the 9Th inst. from Vii la FOrmosa / had the honor to inform your Excellency, that had just return ed from the heights near Gahegos, from whence discovered body of the enemy's troops, composed of 500 cavalry and $500 infantry, with artillery entered Ciudad Rodrigo, by the road from Salamanca. requested col. Waters, to remain on the heights to observe if any other troops of the enemy followed, and from his informa- ton, have reason to believe that another body of infantry, cavalry, and artillery entered Cuidad Rodrigo. in the course of the night.
According to your Excellency's instruc- tons, as soon as l heard of the enemy's movements towards Cuidad Rodrigo, concentrated the troops under my COM mand, and made the necessary prepare tons for a retreat. The enemy, as had expected, advanced at the break of day in two columns, the one in the direc- ton of Gahegos, and the other in that of Carplo, and Espeja. The first was hea. Wy column Of cavalry, and infantry, with some artillery: the second consisted of 5000 infantry at least, but perhaps much more, as from the nature of the ground, the rear guard of these columns could not be perceived, they had upwards Of 1000 cavalry and ten pieces of artillery, which marched through the plain in front OF Fuentes d'Honor, on account Of the plain which gave the enemy's cavalry the advan- tage; ordered the light dragons under brig. gen. Crawford, to retreat first from Galhegos, and Espeia, to Naves d'Ayer. Observingthe rapidityofth the enemy'smove- mems, ordered the light division and the
7 do not exactly krow the enemy's de- SIGNS, I only know with certainty that he ieft Salamanca with 900 infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 81 pieces Of artiilery.-I 49, 80 B. SPENCER. His Excelleney LORD WELLINGTON.